Nothingness is not an empty universe
An empty room, an empty spacetime, and even a physical vacuum are not absolute nothingness: they still have structures, properties, or laws. By absolute nothingness, I mean the absence of all entities, laws, properties, relations, and possible states.
I argue that treating such an absence as one possibility among others implicitly gives it a modal standing that it cannot have. The traditional contrast between ‘Being’ and ‘nothingness’ is therefore, I contend, malformed.
What follows — and what does not
My conclusion is limited in one respect and radical in another: some reality must exist. I do not conclude that this particular universe, its physical constants, or its history must exist exactly as they do.
Causal explanations and chance processes already operate within a reality. I therefore question whether either can explain the existence of reality as such without presupposing the very conditions in need of explanation.
The philosophical pressure point
A critic may reply that the inability to imagine or name nothingness as a state does not itself establish its metaphysical impossibility. I aim at an ontological argument, not merely a psychological or semantic one, and I recognize that this transition demands critical examination.
Is the absence of absolutely everything a genuine metaphysical possibility, or a malformed alternative?
Chapter 1, especially §§1.1–1.7.
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