QUESTION 01 · NECESSITY OF BEING

Why is there something rather than nothing?

The first move is not to explain an event called creation, but to examine whether absolute nothingness can count as a possible state.

Nothingness is not an empty universe

An empty room, an empty spacetime, and even a physical vacuum are not absolute nothingness: they still have structures, properties, or laws. By absolute nothingness, I mean the absence of all entities, laws, properties, relations, and possible states.

I argue that treating such an absence as one possibility among others implicitly gives it a modal standing that it cannot have. The traditional contrast between ‘Being’ and ‘nothingness’ is therefore, I contend, malformed.

What follows — and what does not

My conclusion is limited in one respect and radical in another: some reality must exist. I do not conclude that this particular universe, its physical constants, or its history must exist exactly as they do.

Causal explanations and chance processes already operate within a reality. I therefore question whether either can explain the existence of reality as such without presupposing the very conditions in need of explanation.

The philosophical pressure point

A critic may reply that the inability to imagine or name nothingness as a state does not itself establish its metaphysical impossibility. I aim at an ontological argument, not merely a psychological or semantic one, and I recognize that this transition demands critical examination.

The central question

Is the absence of absolutely everything a genuine metaphysical possibility, or a malformed alternative?

SOURCE IN THE BOOK · EDITION 3.7

Chapter 1, especially §§1.1–1.7.

PhilArchive ↗· PhilPapers ↗· Zenodo (EN) — DOI 3.7 ↗· Zenodo (IT) — DOI 3.7 ↗

IN THE ORIGINAL WORDS OF THE AUTHOR

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